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REAL PROPERTY -
CONSTRUCTION OF COVENANTS RESTRICTING USE OF PREMISES
TWO RECENT CASES
A large house in Richmond was built on a lot subject to a aovenant
limittng the property to a "dwelling or two dwellings". Rooms were let
by the owner to persons, such as school teacher% whose stay was of a perma-
nent nature. HELD: (1) the restriction did not prohibit the owner,
either in express terms or by necessary implication, from renting rooms to
'persons expected to stay as long as their business would permit".
Schwarzschild v. Welborn, 186 Va. 1052, 45 S.E. 2d 152.
A covenant restricted the use of a lot in Norfolk to "one residential
building", and for "residential purposes". HELD: (2) not to preclude the
owner from erecting'a four-family apartment building. Jernigan v. Capps,
187 Va. 73, 45 SE. 2d 886.
In the first case the hQuse was the roomer's dwelling, (3) and not an
ordinary tourist home. The court did not consider this use of the defen-
dant's property such a use as would constitute a place of business - thus
violating the restriction. Certainly the mere fact that more than one
family lives in a large house does not constitute that house a "business"
in the usual commertial sense. Nor was language used in the covenant
appropriate to effect the object suggested by plaintiff, such as "a private
family dwelling".
As to the second case - an apartment building is clearly a residential
building within the accepted definition of that term. (4) However, a
dissenting opirion (5) in the Jernigan case takes the position that an
apartment house, even though it is for residential purposes, is also a
business, and thus is not restricted to residential purposes. The argument
is that if a four family apartment building can be sustained under the
restriction, then, on principle, "larger ones requiring the constant
employment of a manager, desk clerks, inspectors, elevator operators,
mechanics, plumbers, and janitors" must also be sustained. The opinion
points out that an orphanage, a college dormitory, a nurses' home, and even
a jail are used for residential purposes. Bearing in mind that "each case
son must be decided on its merits, considering the facts of the case.',
Boston-Edison Protective Association v. Paulist Fathers, (6) quoted with
approval in the Schwarzschild case, it would seem that the fears of the
dissenting judges would not be likely to materialize if such instances
should come before the courts. Large apartment buildings, with the
attendant commercial characteristics described in the dissenting opinion,
would seem to fall into the category of "business", and thus would not
likely be permitted under a "residential purposes" restriction. (7)
The major principles followed in interpreting building restriction
covenants are:
(1) Equity will eiforce them where, the intention of the parties
is clear and the restrictions are reasonable.
(2) They are not favored by the law and are to b. construed most strictly
against the grantor and persons seeking to enforce them, and
substantial doubt or ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the free
use of property and against restrictions.
(3) A restriction will not be enlarged or extended by construction
or implication beyond the clear meninF of' its terms, even to accomnlish
what it may be thought the narties would have desired had a situation
which later developed been foreseen by them at the time the restriction
was written. (8)
The stated principles indicate that negative restrictions, if reason-
able, will always be given effect, but that positive limitations on use
must be very carefully phrased in order that the result desired by the
parties may clearly appear upon a later reading. (9)
The Supreme Court of Appeals, in following the great weight of
authority (10) ind closely adhering to these principles, are achieving
greater uniformity and affordiug to the practicing attorney more de-
finite standards by which he may be guided in drafting such rectrictive
covenants.
(1) By Mr. Justice Buchanan, per curism.
(2) By Mr. Justice Egrleston, speaking for the majority in 'a four-to-
three decision.
(3) "R house, or sometimes part or a house, occupied as a residence, in
distinction from a store, office, or other building." Websters
New International Dictionary 2d Ed.
(4) "Designed as a residence or for occupation by residents". Websters
Neu International Dictionary 2d Ed, "A fixed and nermanent abode
-or dwelling place for the time boing, as contra distinguished from
a mere temporary locality of existence." 4 Min. Inst. (Qt.I) 367.
(5) By Mr. Justice Staples for the minority.
(6) 306 Mich. 253, 10 N.W. 2d 847.
(7) Deittrich v. Leadbetter, 170, 8 S.E. 2d 276, 127 A.L.R. 849, holding
an overnight tourist home to be o "business" and as violative of a
"residential purnoses" covenant.
"A sanitarium***is not a residence***, such as institution is a
commercial enterprise." Heislor v. Marcear, 95 Fla. 135, 116 So.
447, 448.
But cf. Courtney v. Hunter, 159 Ga. 352, 125 SE 714, holding
a twety-tw unit apirtment house as not violative of this restric-
tion: "the said land shall not be Ysed cxcept for residence purposes.
(8) Stevenson v. Spively, 152 Va. 115, 110 S.E, 37, 21 A.L.R. 1276; 26
C.J,S., Deeds 1C3; 14 Am.Jr., Covenants, 212; Note to Sayles v. Hall,
Ann. Cas. 1912 D 495.
(9) See, e.g. Elterich v. LOicht Real Estate Co., 130 Va. 224, 107 S.E,
755, 18 A.L.B. 441.
(10) Sayles v. Hall, loc. cit., supra,
